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ABSTRACT 
Examining recent judicial opinions, this Article analyzes and 
critiques the transformative-use doctrine two decades after the U.S. 
Supreme Court introduced it into copyright law in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music. When the Court established the transformative-
use concept, which plays a critical role in fair-use determinations 
today, its contours were relatively undefined. Drawing on an 
influential law-review article, the Court described a transformative 
use as one that adds “new expression, meaning or message.” 
Unfortunately, the doctrine and its application are increasingly 
ambiguous, with lower courts developing competing conceptions of 
transformation. This doctrinal murkiness is particularly disturbing 
because fair use is a key proxy for First Amendment interests in 
copyright law. This Article traces the evolution of transformative 
use, analyzes three key paradigms of transformative use that have 
gained prominence in the post-Campbell environment, and offers 
suggestions for a jurisprudence in which transformative use is a 
less significant component of the fair-use analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In its divided opinion in Cariou v. Prince,
1
 the Second Circuit 
addressed the fair-use assertions of an appropriation artist named Richard 
Prince.
2
 Photographer Patrick Cariou sued Prince for copyright 
infringement after Prince “altered and incorporated”3 several of Cariou’s 
photos into his own paintings and collages.
4
 Specifically, Prince cut out 
pictures of Rastafarians from Cariou’s book, Yes Rasta, and then 
“juxtaposed them with images of guitars and naked women for a series of 
collages he called ‘Canal Zone.’ Prince’s gallery then sold some of the 
paintings in the series for $10 million.”5 While one critic dubs Prince “the 
most successful practitioner” of appropriation art, Cariou characterizes 
Prince’s work in “Canal Zone” as “plain laziness.”6 
 
A key element in the Second Circuit’s fair-use determination, as is 
now standard practice in the federal judiciary, was whether Prince had 
engaged in a “transformative use” of Cariou’s photos.7 The majority 
ultimately held that twenty-five of Prince’s works were transformative and 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the other five 
works were similarly transformative.
8
 The court noted that it was unclear 
whether certain alterations Prince made to the five photos “amount[ed] to a 
sufficient transformation of the original work of art such that the new work 
is transformative.”9 
 
Judge J. Clifford Wallace, dissenting in part, was skeptical of the 
majority’s purported ability to identify transformative use in some of the 
                                                     
1
 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).  
2
 See generally Sherri Irvin, Appropriation and Authorship in Contemporary Art, 
45 BRITISH J. AESTHETICS 123 (2005) (providing an excellent overview of 
appropriation art). Prince has been described as one of “the instigators of early 
1980s appropriation or pictures art” who “established his art-world bona fides by 
re-photographing existing photographs: of fashion models, Marlboro men, luxury 
watches, pornography and biker chicks.” Roberta Smith, Tracing a Radical’s 
Progress, Without Any Help From Him, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at E37.  
3
 Prince, 714 F.3d at 698. 
4
 Id. 
5
 All Things Considered: ‘Canal Zone’ Collages Test the Meaning of ‘Fair Use’ 
(National Public Radio broadcast May 16, 2012). 
6
 Adam Lindemann, My Artwork Formerly Known as Prince, N.Y. OBSERVER, 
Mar. 29, 2011, at Culture. 
7
 Prince, 714 F.3d at 704 (noting that Prince “asserted a fair use defense, arguing 
that [his] artworks are transformative of Cariou’s photographs and, accordingly, do 
not violate Cariou’s copyrights”). 
8
 Id. at 711. 
9
 Id. 
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works, but not others.
10
 Judge Wallace found it relevant that Prince had, in 
testimony, seemed to disclaim any interest in the plaintiff’s intent in 
creating the photographs or in creating a work with new meaning through 
his appropriation art. In reasoning reminiscent of Justice Potter Stewart’s 
oft-quoted dictum about obscenity—“I know it when I see it”11—Judge 
Wallace expressed doubt that the majority could simply apply its own 
artistic judgment to identify transformative use in any principled way. 
Wallace asserted that: 
 
[W]hile I admit freely that I am not an art critic or expert, I fail to see 
how the majority in its appellate role can ‘confidently’ draw a 
distinction between the twenty-five works that it has identified as 
constituting fair use and the five works that do not readily lend 
themselves to a fair use determination.”
12
 
 
The division in Prince highlights the tremendous uncertainty 
created by the transformative-use doctrine, which over the last twenty years 
has become something close to the sine qua non in fair use cases.
13
 When 
the U.S. Supreme Court first instantiated this doctrine in Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.
14
 in 1994, its contours were relatively undefined. The 
Court, drawing on an influential article in the Harvard Law Review,
15
 
described a transformative use as one that adds “new expression, meaning 
or message.”16 Yet, it also declined to decide definitively whether the use in 
the case at bar (a rap parody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, Pretty Woman” by 
rappers 2 Live Crew) was indeed transformative.
17
 Instead, the Court 
remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit for further proceedings, noting that 
“we think it is fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s song reasonably could be 
perceived as commenting on the original or criticizing it, to some degree.”18 
With this cursory and equivocal analysis, the Court turned the 
transformative use doctrine loose onto copyright law, where it quickly 
became an enormously important, albeit undertheorized, component in 
                                                     
10
 Id. at 712–14 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
11
 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
12
 Prince, 714 F.3d at 713 (Wallace, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
13
 See HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 2 THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 15:42.30 (2d ed. 1991 & 
Supp. 2010) (“In contemporary fair use jurisprudence it is fair to say that in 
evaluating the first statutory factor—the purpose and character of the use—the 
question of whether the use is ‘transformative’ has emerged as the central and often 
determinative question.”). 
14
 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
15
 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990). 
16
 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
17
 Campbell involved the rap group 2 Live Crew’s use of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh, 
Pretty Woman” in a rap parody. See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.  
18
 Id. at 583. 
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lower-court fair-use determinations.
19
 In the immediate aftermath of 
Campbell and its reception in the lower courts, one perceptive scholar 
described the doctrine of transformative use as “a scrambled mess.”20 
Unfortunately, in the ensuing two decades, the ambiguity surrounding the 
doctrine has, if anything, increased. 
 
This doctrinal murkiness is particularly disturbing because fair use 
is a key proxy for free-expression interests in copyright law. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that fair use, along with the separation of facts 
and ideas from expression, obviates the need for First Amendment scrutiny 
of copyright law by providing an internal statutory safeguard for free-
speech interests.
21
 For example, the Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft alluded to 
fair use, as well as the idea–expression and fact–expression dichotomies, in 
pointing out that “copyright’s built-in free speech safeguards are generally 
adequate”22 when copyright interests conflict with First Amendment values. 
Moreover, the rise of both the Internet and digital media makes users’ 
ability to borrow and remix others’ expression increasingly important.23 As 
Professor Matthew Sag points out: “If fair use is truly arbitrary and 
uncertain, our copyright system is fundamentally broken.”24 
 
Part I of this Article initially examines the basics of fair-use 
analysis in copyright. Next, Part II traces the rise and evolution of the 
transformative-use doctrine, beginning with Campbell. Part III then 
explores three different paradigms of transformative use that have gained 
prominence in the post-Campbell environment. This trio of competing 
conceptualizations fosters a great deal of intellectual incoherence in fair-use 
doctrine. Finally, the Article concludes in Part IV by offering some possible 
                                                     
19
 The transformative use test developed in Campbell has since migrated, as well, to 
right-of-publicity cases. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797, 
808 (Cal. 2001) (citing Campbell as supporting the transformative-use test in a 
right-of-publicity case). 
20
 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change, the Less They Seem 
“Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 251, 252 
(1998). 
21
 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent 
part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were 
incorporated nearly ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government 
entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
22
 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). See also, e.g., Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
23
 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 49 (2012). 
24
 Id. 
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solutions for addressing the problems wrought by the transformative-use 
doctrine. 
I.  THE BASICS OF FAIR USE: A PRIMER 
 Fair use provides a key limitation on the rights of copyright owners. 
It allows some degree of borrowing of copyrighted expression by third 
parties, without either permission from or payment to the copyright 
holder.
25
 As one court explained it, fair-use doctrine “permits courts to 
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would 
stifle the very creativity that the law is designed to foster.”26 
Fair use evolved from the English doctrine of “fair abridgment” that 
arose after passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710.
27
 The first U.S. synthesis 
of the doctrine is generally credited to Justice Joseph Story in Folsom v. 
Marsh in 1841.
28
 Although fair use began as an equitable doctrine, and still 
retains an aura of equity because of its ad hoc nature, it has been firmly 
ensconced in federal statutory law since enactment of the 1976 Copyright 
Act.
29
 
The fair-use section of the Act begins with a preamble that lists a 
variety of potential fair uses, including “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research,”30 although this list is not intended to be 
exhaustive. The statute then provides four nonexclusive factors, derived 
largely from Story’s synthesis in Folsom, which courts typically evaluate 
seriatim to determine whether a particular use is fair: 
1. the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; 
2. the nature of the copyrighted work; 
3. the amount of substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
4. the effects of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.
31
 
As with many multi-factor legal tests, this four-part standard by 
itself introduces considerable uncertainty into a typical fair-use defense. 
                                                     
25
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2013). 
26
 Iowa St. Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
27
 William F. Patry, Patry on Fair Use 8 (2010).  
28
 9 F. Cas. 342, No. 4901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). 
29
 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2013). 
30
 Id. 
31
 Id. 
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One court referred to fair use as “exceptionally elusive, even for the law,”32 
while Professor Paul Goldstein called it “the great white whale of American 
copyright law. Enthralling, enigmatic, protean . . . .”33 Noted commentator 
David Nimmer famously said of the doctrine’s perceived indeterminacy that 
“had Congress legislated a dartboard rather than the particular four fair use 
factors embodied in the Copyright Act, it appears that the upshot would be 
the same.”34  
Courts have considerable discretion in the application of the factors. 
Although some authority exists for the fourth factor being the most 
important,
35
 it has since been overshadowed by the transformative-use 
doctrine (notably absent from the four statutory factors) articulated in 
Campbell. It is to the rise of the transformative-use doctrine that the next 
Part turns. 
II. TRANSFORMATIVE USE ASCENDANT: FROM SCHOLARLY ROOTS 
TO JUDICIAL INSTANTIATION  
 Transformative use, like most legal doctrines, did not arise ex 
nihilo. A precursor doctrine—“productive use”—had been part of fair use, 
at least in some cases, for some time.
36
 At least one understanding of 
productive use had been that it involved the use of others’ copyrighted 
expression to create a new work.
37
 However, the Supreme Court in Sony 
Corp of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
38
 in 1984 rejected the notion 
that the presence or absence of productive use was pivotal as to whether a 
particular use was fair.
39
 The Court did note that “the distinction between 
‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ uses may be helpful in calibrating the 
balance, but it cannot be wholly determinative.”40 
Productive use morphed into transformative use in a thoughtful and 
widely cited Harvard Law Review article by Judge Pierre N. Leval of the 
                                                     
32
 Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Film Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
33
 Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 433 (2008). 
34
 David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003). 
35
 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 
(1985). 
36
 Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use 
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995). 
37
 Id. at 708. 
38
 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
39
 Id. at 455. 
40
 Id. at 456 n. 40. 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
41
 Judge Leval’s thesis was 
that fair use needed a guiding principle then absent from the case law: 
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier 
decisions provide little basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and 
divided courts are commonplace. The opinions reflect widely differing 
notions of the meaning of fair use. Decisions are not governed by 
consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions 
to individual fact patterns.
42
 
Judge Leval’s solution was to find a new, guiding principle using 
the basic goal of copyright law: encouraging creativity and innovation in 
literary and artistic works for the public good. This prime directive of 
copyright law is contained in the Copyright and Patent Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which expresses the purpose of copyright and patent law as 
existing “To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts . . . .”43 
This goal of promoting progress in turn meant, Leval reasoned, that 
borrowings of copyrighted expression furthering such intellectual or artistic 
progress—transformative uses—should be considered fair, while other 
appropriations should not: 
The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a 
different manner or for a different purpose from the original. A 
quotation of copyrighted material that merely repackages or 
republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test; in Justice Story’s 
words, it would merely ‘supersede the objects’ of the original. If, on 
the other hand, the secondary use adds value to the original—if the 
quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—
this is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to 
protect for the enrichment of society.
44
  
Leval’s thesis of conceptual isomorphism between the purposes of 
copyright writ large and the purpose (and operation) of fair use, while neat, 
tidy and intuitively appealing, was clearly adventurous. Neither the history 
of fair-use law in the United States nor the text of the statute provided 
strong support for Judge Leval’s sweeping synthesis.45 Early copyright law 
in the U.S. was considerably narrower than the law as it stands now; many 
issues we might debate today as possible fair uses were simply not 
                                                     
41
 Leval, supra note 15. 
42
 Id. at 1106–1107. 
43
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
44
 Leval, supra note 15, at 1111. 
45
 See, e.g., MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 431 (1999) 
(writing that “despite its seductive charm and approbation in the case law, the 
productive use doctrine is neither supported by the language of the statute or the 
legislative history”). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 99  
infringing. As Professor Lawrence Lessig has pointed out, the first 
copyright act covered only “maps, charts, and books,” and only protected 
against verbatim copying.
46
  
Even more significantly for Judge Leval’s thesis, as Professor Laura 
Lape has noted, fair use in the nineteenth century “was in its barest infancy, 
and was hardly a coherent or clearly delineated doctrine, as may sometimes 
be implied. [Moreover,] notwithstanding certain scholarly and judicial 
assertions to the contrary, nineteenth century case law does not support the 
existence of a productive use factor for fair use.”47 Thus, the historical 
pedigree Judge Leval claimed for his proposed alignment of the purpose of 
copyright and that of fair use was, at best, contested. The unifying principle 
he advocates is an intellectually elegant one, but it is his invention, which 
has significant implications for its adoption as law, particularly in a 
statutory area (although the fair use statute is sufficiently open textured to 
encourage some level of judicial innovation). It was, of course, also 
apparent that the newly christened transformative-use doctrine was a 
repackaged formulation of productive use, as Judge Leval’s quoted passage 
above explicitly states.
48
 
Judge Leval’s new creation was embraced enthusiastically in 
Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Campbell. While the Court did not 
accept transformative use as necessary to a fair use, just as the Sony Court 
had treated productive use, it was nonetheless regarded as highly auspicious 
in the new analytical scheme Campbell created.
49
  
Campbell arose when notorious rappers 2 Live Crew appropriated 
the first lyric line and a key opening musical phrase from “Oh, Pretty 
Woman,” a widely recorded popular song most associated with Roy 
Orbison.
50
 The 2 Live Crew version was arguably a rap parody of the 
original, particularly using crude references to sexuality to skewer the 
                                                     
46
 Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1061 
(2001). 
47
 Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use 
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677, 688 (1995) (emphasis added) (citing, among other 
things, Judge Leval’s seminal article). 
48
 Judge Leval has emphasized the connection between productive use and 
transformative use, stating in a later lecture that the Supreme Court’s adoption of 
transformative use in Campbell “restores the lost emphasis on ‘productive use,’ but 
now in the context of a far more sophisticated discussion, related in every detail to 
the basic objectives of copyright doctrine.” Pierre N. Leval,  Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose: Justice Souter’s Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 22 
(1994). 
49
 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
50
 Id. at 573. 
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perceived naiveté of the original.
51
 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous 
opinion written by Justice Souter, found that the Sixth Circuit had 
misapplied the first fair-use factor, the purpose and character of the use, by 
ruling that that factor weighed against fair use due to the commercial nature 
of 2 Live Crew’s appropriation.52 
The Court, citing Judge Leval, rejected the notion that a commercial 
use necessarily leads to an unfavorable finding as to the first fair-use factor. 
Instead, the Court stated, the factor one inquiry should determine whether 
the new work “adds something new with a further purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or message . . . 
.”53 This sort of alteration is the essence of a transformative use. Although a 
transformative use was not required for the use to be fair, the Court 
reasoned that “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a 
finding of fair use.”54 
Justice Souter’s opinion also noted that the transformative-use 
doctrine had implications for fair-use factors beyond the first, the purpose 
and character of the use. For example, the transformative nature of parody, 
the Court reasoned, could give a parodist more leeway on the third fair-use 
factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used.
55
 The parodist, to 
craft a successful parody recognizable to the audience, may need to borrow 
more of the original work—perhaps even the heart of it—in order to evoke 
the original in the minds of audience members.
56
 The Court also noted as to 
the fourth fair-use factor, the effect on the market for the original, that 
transformative uses are often less likely to harm the market for the original 
work. As Justice Souter wrote, when “the second use is transformative, 
market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so 
readily inferred.”57 
Justice Souter’s opinion also cautioned against evaluation of the 
aesthetic worth of the borrowing work, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’ famous line from Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.58 on 
the copyrightability of circus posters: “[I]t would be a dangerous 
                                                     
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. at 579 (emphasis added). 
54
 Id.  
55
 Id. at 588. 
56
 Id. at 588–89 (“Copyright does not become excessive in relation to parodic 
purpose merely because the portion taken was the original’s heart. If 2 Live Crew 
had copied a significantly less memorable part of the original [Roy Orbison song], 
it is difficult to see how its parodic character would have come through.”) 
57
 Id. at 591. 
58
 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
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undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves 
final judges of the worth of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits.”59 The fine line between aesthetic evaluation and the 
determination of transformative use continues to bedevil lower courts, as 
later Parts of this Article make clear. 
A close reading of Campbell nonetheless reveals difficulties with its 
exposition of transformative use. Aside from the definition quoted above 
(adding new expression, meaning or message), there was little attention to 
the analytical nuances of the doctrine. It was not clear, for example, how 
transformative use differed from its earlier incarnation as productive use, if 
indeed it did. If there was no difference, one wondered why the dramatic 
announcement of new terminology was required. Moreover, some of Justice 
Souter’s language blurred the sense of whether certain passages in the 
opinion were applicable only to parodists or to all transformative users. It 
was clear that parody was a subset of transformative use, but the precise 
contours of the distinctions between the two were hazy in Campbell. These 
ambiguities no doubt contributed to the current muddled state of the 
doctrine. 
Despite its legal murkiness, the transformative use doctrine 
gradually became central to fair use determinations in many lower courts. 
As an empirical study by Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel of fair-use 
cases from 2006 to 2010 concluded, “fair use doctrine today is 
overwhelmingly dominated by the Leval–Campbell transformative use 
doctrine.”60 Netanel examined a total of sixty-eight judicial opinions, of 
which he noted that “[the] recent decisions that unequivocally characterize 
the defendant’s use as transformative almost universally find fair use.”61 
Similarly, “all but three cases that characterized the use in question as non-
transformative, or only ‘minimally,’ ‘partly,’ or ‘somewhat’ transformative, 
found no fair use.”62 
 
                                                     
59
 Id. at 251. 
60
 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
715, 736 (2011). For another empirical study demonstrating the centrality of the 
transformative doctrine to fair use determinations, see Matthew Sag, Predicting 
Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012). An earlier empirical study that left off in 
2005 argued that the influence of the transformative factor was exaggerated at that 
point, although that study nonetheless pointed out that “in those opinions in which 
transformativeness did play a role, it exerted nearly dispositive force not simply on 
the outcome of factor one, but on the overall outcome of the fair use test.” Barton 
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 
U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 (2008). 
61
 Netanel, supra note 60, at 740. 
62
 Id. at 741. 
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III. TRANSFORMATIVE USE ASCENDANT: FROM SCHOLARLY ROOTS 
TO JUDICIAL INSTANTIATION 
This Part explores three different ways in which courts since 
Campbell have conceptualized the transformative-use doctrine. 
A.  Transformation as New Insights 
 One mode of conceptualizing transformative use is captured in 
Professor William F. Patry’s emphasis on the new insights added by the 
borrower as the key to transformative use. Professor Patry argues that “the 
form that the productive or transformative use takes—e.g., a new work or 
commentary—is less important than the presence and quality of the new 
insight.”63 The “new insights” paradigm also gains support from the fair-use 
statute’s preamble, with its enumeration of criticism, comment, scholarship 
and the like as potentially favored uses. 
A classic new-insights case is the Second Circuit’s Leibovitz v. 
Paramount Pictures Corp.,
64
 decided in 1998. In Leibovitz, Paramount 
created an advertisement for its movie Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult 
that parodied Annie Leibovitz’s iconic Vanity Fair cover photograph of a 
nude, enormously pregnant Demi Moore. Paramount’s ad featured a similar 
looking nude, pregnant woman, but with the superimposed face of a 
smirking Leslie Nielsen, the lead actor in the film. The ad copy read: “Due 
This March.”  
In considering whether the Nielsen ad was transformative, the 
Second Circuit found that Paramount brought new meaning to the original 
photo by directing “deflating ridicule” toward it: “Because the smirking 
face of Nielsen contrasts so strikingly with the serious expression on the 
face of Moore, the ad may reasonably be perceived as commenting on the 
seriousness, even the pretentiousness, of the original.”65 The court noted 
that, while not every feature of a defendant’s work that was merely different 
                                                     
63
 William F. Patry, Patry on Fair Use 123 (2010). 
64
 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see, 
e.g., Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 
1998) (concluding that the “Seinfeld Aptitude Test,” a trivia quiz book about the 
television show, had no “transformative purpose,” since it provided no commentary 
on the show, but instead simply posed questions about the episodes); Columbia 
Pictures, Inc. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 1998) 
(holding that a movie poster for a Michael Moore documentary that drew upon 
poster for hit film Men in Black was not transformative since it did not comment on 
or criticize original work); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 
802 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that an artist whose works placed “Barbie” dolls in 
danger from household appliances engaged in transformative use by commenting 
on Barbie’s cultural influence). 
65
 Id. at 114. 
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from the plaintiff’s original could necessarily provide transformative 
commentary on the original, Paramount’s work sufficiently demonstrated 
such transformativeness. The Second Circuit further reasoned that “the ad 
might also be reasonably perceived as interpreting the Leibovitz photograph 
to extol the beauty of the female body, and rather unchivalrously, to express 
disagreement with this message.”66 
While this brand of deep reading is contestable, the Second Circuit 
clearly sought more than new meaning or expression standing alone, but 
new meaning or expression linked to and directed toward the borrowed 
work. Without new insights aimed at the plaintiff’s original work, aesthetic 
changes in the borrowing work are not enough to warrant the label 
“transformative” under this approach. 
A similar approach to identifying transformation is at work in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., a case 
in which an author borrowed significant portions of Margaret Mitchell’s 
novel Gone With the Wind.
67
 Alice Randall wrote The Wind Done Gone 
from the perspective of Scarlett’s half-sister Cynara, who is a slave. 
Randall’s work critiqued Mitchell’s novel and its portrayal of slavery and 
the South. In creating The Wind Done Gone, “she appropriated the 
characters, plot and major scenes from GWTW into the first half of 
TWDG.”68 
In its analysis of the transformative factor, the circuit court seemed 
exclusively focused on new insights that Randall’s book could bring to the 
original: “Randall’s work flips GWTW’s traditional race roles, portrays 
powerful whites as stupid or feckless, and generally sets out to demystify 
GWTW and the strip the romanticism from Mitchell’s specific account . . . 
.”69 Quoting Campbell, the Eleventh Circuit found that Randall’s novel 
“reflects transformative value because it ‘can provide social benefit by 
shedding light on an earlier work, and in the process, creating a new 
one.’”70 To the Eleventh Circuit, “transformative value” is inherently tied to 
the new-insights model. 
Of course, one might argue that Leibovitz and Suntrust Bank are 
parody cases and that it is this factual configuration that drives the judicial 
demand for new insights.
71
 But there are non-parody cases that also require 
                                                     
66
 Id. at 115. 
67
 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
68
 Id. at 1259. 
69
 Id. at 1270. 
70
 Id. at 1271 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 
(1994)). 
71
 The paradigm transformative-use scenario, Campbell, was of course a parody 
case, and there the Court, although defining transformative use quite broadly, 
104 THE JURISPRUDENCE OF TRANSFORMATION  [Vol. 12 
 
new insights connected to the original to qualify as transformative use. 
Consider, for example, Gaylord v. United States, a Federal Circuit case 
dealing with a photograph of a war memorial.
72
 In Gaylord, the Postal 
Service selected a work by photographer John Alli for a stamp 
commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Korean War armistice. Alli 
had taken a photo of the National Korean War Veteran’s Memorial in 
Washington, D.C., a sculptural work created by Frank Gaylord. The 
memorial itself consisted of “‘19 stainless steel statues representing a 
platoon of foot soldiers in formation,’ referred to as The Column.”73 Alli’s 
photograph, subsequently issued as a stamp, was taken after a winter storm 
had encased the statues in snow and dim lighting conditions created a 
surreal feel to the photo. 
The Court of Federal Claims held that the stamp with Alli’s photo 
was “a transformative work, having a new and different character and 
expression than Mr. Gaylord’s ‘The Column.’”74 The Federal Circuit panel 
disagreed, citing cases in which the borrowing works commented on some 
aspect of the originals, such as Blanch v. Koons
75
 and Lennon v. Premise 
Media Corp.
76
 In Blanch, noted visual artist Jeff Koons borrowed a 
copyrighted photograph of a woman’s feet in Gucci sandals, incorporating it 
into a painted collage. In Lennon, documentary filmmakers used a brief clip 
from the John Lennon song “Imagine,” juxtaposed with images of Stalin. In 
both cases, the Federal Circuit reasoned, the borrowing work commented on 
the original work—in Blanch through a “commentary on the social and 
aesthetic consequences of mass media,”77 and in Lennon through a critique 
of the singer’s naïve view of what a world without religion might look like. 
In Gaylord, the Federal Circuit ruled that the stamp did not 
“transform the character of [the original work] The Column,” unlike the 
works in Blanch and Lennon
 
.
78
 The court stated that “[a]lthough the stamp 
altered the appearance of The Column by adding snow and muting the 
color, these alterations do not impart a different character to the work.”79 
While the court noted other possible routes to a fair-use defense, including 
historical scholarship that incorporates original source material to add 
context, the primary route to transformative use nonetheless was, for this 
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court, the new-insights model. Yet it is not at all clear from Campbell that 
new insights, particularly vis-à-vis the borrowed work, are required in order 
to create a transformative use. 
The new insights model was clearly operating in a 1997 Ninth 
Circuit case, Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.
80
 The 
defendant published The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, which 
retold the O. J. Simpson murder trial in the style of Dr. Seuss. The Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the borrowing work, which used the Seussian poetic style 
and some elements of the original to recount an entirely different set of 
events, was not transformative. As the Ninth Circuit put it: 
While Simpson is depicted 13 times in the Cat’s distinctively 
scrunched and somewhat shabby red and white stove-pipe hat, the 
substance and content of The Cat in the Hat is not conjured up by the 
focus on the Brown-Goldman murders or the O. J. Simpson trial. 
Because there is no effort to create a transformative work with ‘new 
expression, meaning or message,’ the infringing work’s commercial 
use further cuts against the fair use defense.
81
 
The Ninth Circuit failed to cite any support for the notion that the 
only way to create a transformative work in this context was by conjuring 
up the borrowed work.
82
 The very different nature of the expression in the 
defendant’s work certainly seemed, on its face, to meet the “new 
expression, meaning or message” rubric. As the Nimmer treatise put it, “[i]t 
is hard to imagine a message or meaning more disparate from Theodore 
Geisel’s children’s classic than making his Cat into a murderer who beats 
the system and gets off scot-free.”83 
While the new-insights paradigm has intuitive appeal, it nonetheless 
seems relatively far afield from the original meaning of transformative use. 
Recall that the Supreme Court defined a transformative use as one that 
“adds something new with a further purpose or different character, altering 
the first with new expression, meaning or message . . . .”84 However, the-
new insights model seems to add an additional requirement—whatever 
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“new” is added must relate back to the borrowed work and provide some 
degree of commentary on that work. This suggests, at the very least, a 
change in emphasis from the locus classicus of transformative use, Judge 
Leval’s article, in which the transformative concept is not so backward-
looking:  
If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds value to the original—if 
the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation 
of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and 
understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair use 
doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society.
85
 
In this formulation, at least, as long as the borrowed work is materially 
altered and the new work adds some additional artistic or intellectual value 
beyond that of the original, the criteria of transformative use are met. 
B.  Transformation as Creative Metamorphosis 
 A number of important fair-use cases have applied a more 
straightforward definition of transformative use than the new-insights model 
provides. This alternative approach simply involves sufficient aesthetic 
alteration of the original work, without requiring new insights directed 
toward the borrowed work. These cases
86
 simply ask that the new work 
perform some unspecified degree of “creative metamorphosis”87 to the 
original work. 
In Prince, for example, the Second Circuit analyzed the fair-use 
claims of appropriation artist Richard Prince in an infringement suit by 
photographer Patrick Cariou.
88
 Cariou’s work, Yes Rasta, was a book of 
landscape and portrait photos involving Rastafarians in Jamaica. Cariou 
testified the photos were “‘extreme classical photography and portraiture,’ 
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and that he did not ‘want that book to look pop culture at all.’”89 Prince’s 
Canal Zone collage took thirty-five photographs from Yes Rasta and 
attached them to plywood. Prince then “altered the photographs 
significantly, by among other things painting ‘lozenges’ over their subjects’ 
facial features and using only portions of the some of the images.”90 Prince 
later created thirty additional works that included Cariou’s images in whole 
or in part.
91
 In some of Prince’s works, the photos are obscured, tinted, or 
otherwise altered.
92
 Prince’s works dwarfed the size of Cariou’s photos—as 
the court put it, “the smallest of the Prince artworks measures 40” x 30”, or 
approximately ten times as large as each page of Yes Rasta.”93 
The Second Circuit made short work of the new-insights model, 
rejecting the district court’s requirement that the borrowing work comment 
on or critically refer to the borrowed work. As the Second Circuit stated: 
The law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original 
or its author in order to be considered transformative, and a secondary 
work may constitute a fair use even if it serves some purpose other 
than those (criticism, comment, new reporting, teaching, scholarship, 
and research) identified in the preamble to the statute.
94
  
All that Campbell required, the Prince court reasoned, was that a 
transformative user alter the original with “new expression, meaning, or 
message.”95 
In its analysis of Prince’s works, the court determined, simply by 
examining each work, that all but five of the thirty pieces at issue were 
clearly transformative as a matter of law. The court held that those “twenty-
five of Prince’s artworks manifest an entirely different aesthetic from 
Cariou’s photographs,” because “[w]here Cariou’s serene and deliberately 
composed portraits and landscape photographs depict the natural beauty of 
Rastafarians and their surrounding environs, Prince’s crude and jarring 
works, on the other hand, are hectic and provocative.”96 The court also 
noted that the twenty-five works differed greatly from Cariou’s photos in 
“composition, presentation, scale, color palette, and media . . . .”97 
The Second Circuit majority furthermore downplayed the 
importance of Prince’s testimony that he did not have a particular message 
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he wanted to convey with his work and that he had no interest in the intent 
behind the original photos. These considerations were not critical to 
transformative use. Instead, the court explained, transformative use was to 
be determined based on how a reasonable observer might respond to the 
works.
98
 “Prince’s work could be transformative without even commenting 
on Cariou’s work or on culture,” the court wrote, “and even without 
Prince’s stated intention to do so.”99 In this case, the Second Circuit 
reasoned, twenty-five of the works were transformative because they clearly 
“have a different character, give Cariou’s photographs a new expression, 
and employ new aesthetics with creative and communicative results distinct 
from Cariou’s.”100 
The court held, however, that five of Prince’s works involved a 
closer question on the issue of transformative use. Although these works 
had “minimal alterations” that “moved the work in a different direction 
from Cariou’s classical portraiture and landscape photos,”101 they 
nonetheless were sufficiently similar to the borrowed photos that the Second 
Circuit could not say with certainty that they offered enough new 
expression, meaning, or message to qualify as transformative.
102
 
The court discussed several of the works in depth, noting artistic 
similarities and differences. For example, Prince’s work Charlie Company 
“prominently displays four copies of Cariou’s photograph of a Rastafarian 
riding a donkey, substantially unaltered, as well as two copies of a seated 
nude woman with lozenges covering all six faces.”103 It also featured a 
pastoral background that was not unlike Cariou’s work. The court was 
unsure whether the differences between the works in this instance were 
sufficiently transformative.
104
 As a result, the Second Circuit concluded that 
“the district court is best situated to determine, in the first instance, whether 
such relatively minimal alterations”105 made the five borrowings 
transformative, and, ultimately, fair. 
It is unclear precisely what metric of transformation was applied in 
Prince. The court could not seem to articulate a standard beyond a purely 
impressionistic sense of how much aesthetic change the court “felt” was 
sufficient to constitute transformation. Nor was it entirely clear why the 
district court might be “best situated” to make the ultimate determination. 
As noted earlier, Judge Wallace, in partial dissent, expressed skepticism 
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about the majority’s ability to draw principled distinctions between the 
twenty-five works it viewed as transformative and the five works it viewed 
as questionable.
106
 Nor did Judge Wallace appear to believe a manageable 
standard had been articulated: “Certainly we are not merely to use our 
personal art views to make the new legal application to the facts of this 
case.”107 But Judge Wallace failed to propose a standard for determining 
whether a given use is transformative, and did not articulate what the 
district court should consider on remand. 
The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s 
determination that Prince took too much of the original under the third fair-
use factor (extent of the use). At this point in the opinion, the conflation of 
transformative use and parody that bedeviled Justice Souter’s Campbell 
opinion added significant confusion. The Second Circuit stated that the 
district court’s conclusion that Prince took more of the original photos than 
necessary was incorrect because “the law does not require that the 
secondary artist may take no more than is necessary,”108 citing the portion 
of Campbell that dealt with factor three. However, that section of Campbell 
spoke specifically to the parodist’s need to use enough of the original work 
to make clear to the audience what the target of the parody was.
109
 It did not 
explicitly license larger takings for transformative works that were not 
critiquing or commenting on the original. 
The Second Circuit quoted Campbell for the proposition that the 
borrower “’must be permitted to “conjure up” at least enough of the 
original’ to fulfill its transformative purpose.”110 But the critical language 
from Campbell omitted by the Second Circuit’s quotation from that case 
was that “the parody must be able to ‘conjure up’ at least enough of that 
original to make the object of its critical wit recognizable.”111 This language 
from Campbell was quite clearly aimed at parodists in particular, not 
transformative users in general. Moreover, under the creative-
metamorphosis paradigm, how can one possibly determine how much of the 
original work is needed to “conjure [it] up” if the borrowing work has no 
necessary connection to the original and is not commenting on it? The 
question becomes nonsensical outside of the new-insights model. If the 
putative fair user is not somehow connecting his or her work to the original, 
there is no particular amount of the original work that would need to be 
used to conjure up anything. 
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Prince illustrates the serious difficulties with the creative-
metamorphosis model, involving as it does complex judgments about 
literary and artistic works that may be beyond the aesthetic acumen of the 
average judge. Moreover, the paucity of guidance from Campbell requires 
that those judgments be made without any sort of rigorous framework to 
guide the decision. 
Those same difficulties arise when the transformative-use doctrine 
is imported from copyright doctrine into right-of-publicity law. Right-of-
publicity cases adapting Campbell largely follow the creative-
metamorphosis model of transformativeness, beginning with the first case to 
apply transformative use to publicity law, the California Supreme Court’s 
2001 decision in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup.
112
 Comedy III 
involved a charcoal drawing reproduced on t-shirts of the legendary comedy 
team The Three Stooges. The licensing entity for the Stooges claimed that 
this use violated California’s right-of-publicity statute. In order to balance 
the publicity right against the defendant’s First Amendment rights, the 
California Supreme Court rejected the extant approaches to achieving that 
balance, instead ruling, for the first time, that the appropriate standard was 
the transformative-use test.
113
 
The California Supreme Court held that, when a right-of-publicity 
defendant simply crafts some sort of accurate and unembroidered depiction 
                                                     
112
 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). Numerous arguments have been made that the 
transformative-use doctrine is a bad fit for publicity law because the publicity tort 
differs in important ways from copyright protection. While the focus of this work is 
on the application of the doctrine, rather than its ultimate justification, it seems 
clear that those arguments carry significant weight.  
One objection has been that publicity rights do not provide the same sort 
of incentive to the creation of a public persona that copyright does to the creation of 
artistic and literary works. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. V. Major League Baseball 
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, 
Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Speech Theory: Sam, 
You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. 283, 306 (2000) ( 
“[N]ot a shred of empirical data exists to show that anyone would change her 
behavior with regard to her primary activity—that is, that a person would invest 
less energy and talent in becoming a sports star or entertainer or great civic figure—
if she knew in advance that, after achieving fame, she would be unable to capture 
licensing fees from putting her face on sweatshirts or coffee mugs.”).  
Another objection is that the law should not encourage the production of 
celebrity personae the way copyright doctrine encourages the creation of 
copyrighted works. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of 
Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006) ( 
“[S]ociety doesn’t need to encourage more celebrities or more marketing of 
celebrity image.”). 
113
 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808. 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 111  
of the plaintiff, whether in words, images, or some other form of expression, 
First Amendment interests are outweighed by the policy of protecting the 
plaintiff’s persona.114 But when the defendant adds transformative 
expressive elements, the free-expression interest becomes stronger.
115
 
Moreover, the transformed persona is “less likely to interfere with the 
economic interest protected by the right of publicity.”116 Thus, the First 
Amendment test based on transformative use asks whether the celebrity’s 
persona is merely one of the “raw materials” in the ultimate depiction or is 
the “sum and substance of the work in question.”117 This is, of course, the 
creative-metamorphosis model in a nutshell. Ultimately, the California 
Supreme Court found an absence of transformation in Saderup’s depiction 
of The Three Stooges, because it was a straightforward, literal visual 
portrayal of the comedy team.
118
 
There are two important points from Comedy III. First, once the 
transformative-use test is transplanted into the alien soil of right-of-
publicity law, the creative-metamorphosis model is almost obligatory since 
there is no original “work” with which to compare the borrowed expression, 
as in a copyright action.
119
 Rather than a specific song, photograph, poem, 
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or other work, as in copyright, the “original” in publicity law is an 
amorphous entity known as the celebrity’s persona, which can include 
references to the person’s name, likeness, voice, or other identifying 
characteristics.
120
 This distinction between copyright and publicity law 
makes the new-insights model a much more challenging fit, although 
certainly not impossible. Second, Comedy III did not import the whole of 
the fair-use analysis into right-of-publicity doctrine, but only the 
transformative-use test. The California Supreme Court provided scant 
conceptual justification for plucking a single element from the multi-part 
fair-use test and elevating it to such a critical role in the First Amendment 
status of speech that may infringe publicity rights. Nonetheless, in the 
Comedy III model, transformativeness is the sole and exclusive route to 
vindication of a defendant’s First Amendment rights. 
If transformative use is, rightly or wrongly, a dominant 
consideration in current copyright fair-use doctrine, it is the only 
consideration in publicity cases that follow the Comedy III approach. This 
makes the imprecision of the test particularly disturbing. Comedy III’s 
progeny show clear evidence of being infected by this legal imprecision. 
Consider, for example, the 2013 split decision by the Third Circuit 
in Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,
121
 a right-of-publicity case brought by 
former Rutgers quarterback Ryan Hart. Hart sued Electronic Arts (“EA”) 
for unauthorized use of his persona
122
 in the company’s successful NCAA 
Football video game. The game includes “digital avatars” of real college 
players “that resemble their real-life counterparts and share their vital and 
biographical information.”123 EA also promoted the game using actual film 
footage of the real Hart throwing a pass in a bowl game against Arizona 
State.
124
 
After rejecting various techniques of balancing First Amendment 
interests against the right of publicity, the Third Circuit adopted the 
transformative-use test as its guiding framework. The court declined to 
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adopt the “Predominant Use Test” used by the Missouri Supreme Court in 
Doe v. TCI Cablevision.
125
 This test asks whether the use of the plaintiff’s 
persona primarily exploits the commercial value of that persona or primarily 
makes an expressive use of the individual’s identity.126 The Third Circuit 
opined that “the Predominant Use Test is subjective at best, arbitrary at 
worst, and in either case calls upon judges to act as both impartial jurists 
and discerning art critics. These two roles cannot co-exist.”127 The irony, of 
course, is that much the same could be said about the transformative-use 
doctrine the court chose to apply instead.  
In applying the transformative-use test to the facts of Hart, the 
Third Circuit considered both the use of Hart’s likeness and his biographical 
information in the video game. The court noted that Hart’s digital avatar 
“closely resembles the genuine article. Not only does the digital avatar 
match Appellant in terms of hair color, hair style and skin tone, but the 
avatar’s accessories mimic those worn by Appellant during his time as a 
Rutger’s player.”128 The court found that Hart’s biographical and statistical 
information in the game was likewise an accurate representation of 
reality.
129
 Moreover, the digital avatar did exactly what the real Hart did in 
his heyday—played college football in a digitized stadium that recreated the 
atmosphere of a college football game. “This is not transformative,” the 
court wrote. “[T]he various digitized sights and sounds in the video game 
do not alter or transform the Appellant’s identity in a significant way.”130  
The Third Circuit also rejected the notion that a game feature that 
allowed users to alter the avatar’s appearance created any legally significant 
transformation.
131
 The court was convinced that a major part of the game’s 
appeal was its realism, and thus that EA was capitalizing on the identities of 
the real players.
132
 The avatar that closely resembled the player was the 
default setting, and the mere fact that a consumer could alter the image was 
insufficiently transformative.
133
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Nor was the court convinced by EA’s argument that “other creative 
elements of NCAA Football, which do not affect Appellant’s digital avatar, 
are so numerous that the videogames should be considered 
transformative.”134 The various sights and sounds that went into the game 
itself were thus not appropriate considerations. The focus, the court 
reasoned, should be on how the celebrity persona itself is used, not on 
additional creative elements that frame the persona but do not directly act 
upon or alter the celebrity identity.
135
 The court held that creative elements 
of the work that do not directly affect the celebrity identity are without legal 
significance.
136
  
Judge Thomas L. Ambro, in dissent, took strong exception to the 
position that other expressive elements in the game carried no weight in the 
transformativeness inquiry. He quoted Comedy III for the proposition that 
the celebrity likeness must be considered within the totality of the work in 
question, whether it “is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original 
work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is 
the very sum and substance of the work in question.”137 
Judge Ambro noted that the Hart majority analyzed only changes to 
the digital avatar itself, rather than how that likeness fit into the entirety of 
the highly creative work that was the video game: “To me, a narrow focus 
on an individual’s likeness, rather than how the likeness is incorporated into 
and transformed by the work as a whole, is a flawed formulation of the 
transformative inquiry.”138 Ambro also noted that the insertion of real 
individuals into novels, films, and other media is generally protected under 
publicity law, and that his reading of the transformative-use test would 
better harmonize with broader First Amendment doctrine as applied to 
publicity cases.
139
 
The conflict between the Hart majority and Judge Ambro is not a 
new phenomenon for courts attempting to apply the creative-metamorphosis 
model of the transformative test. One scholar has referred to this division as 
the “fused” versus “intact” problem.140 Courts sometimes seem to have 
difficulty deciding whether to focus on the totality of the work into the 
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which the borrowed material (whether expression or persona) has been 
“fused,” creating an entirely new, conceptually indivisible work, or on the 
individual borrowed material standing alone (“intact”), even if that 
borrowed material is surrounded by new expressive work. Courts seem to 
differ on the exact site of any necessary transformation—must the 
individual, borrowed portion be transformed, or is it enough that the 
borrowed material is fused into a larger expressive whole that is itself 
transformative? 
This is precisely the conflict at the heart of the transformative-use 
determination in Tiger Woods’s right-of-publicity case, ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publishing, Inc., decided by the Sixth Circuit in 2003.
141
 The work there 
was a sports painting by artist Rick Rush, “The Masters of Augusta,” 
commemorating Woods’s victory in the 1997 Masters golf tournament. 
Woods’s triumph was notable both for the huge, twelve-stroke margin of 
victory and for Woods’s win given the racially charged history of the 
event.
142
 The painting portrayed three different images of Woods marching 
toward victory, as well as images of former champions, including Jack 
Nicklaus, Arnold Palmer and Bobby Jones. 
A majority of the Sixth Circuit panel found the work was 
transformative, despite the fact that the images of Woods himself were 
simply accurate depictions of the golfer. The majority pointed out that the 
painting contained “a collage of images in addition to Woods’s image 
which are combined to describe, in artistic form, a historic event in sports 
history and to convey a message about the significance of Woods’s 
achievement . . . .”143 These transformative elements, the court stated, 
entitled the work to First Amendment protection. This reasoning illustrates 
the classic “fused” view of the borrowed image (Woods’s likeness) 
becoming a conceptually inseparable element within a larger, 
transformative work. 
However, Judge Eric L. Clay, in dissent, focused much more on the 
“intact” image of Woods standing alone. Judge Clay found it “difficult to 
discern any appreciable transformative or creative contribution”144 in the 
Rush painting. He further reasoned that: 
Indeed, the rendition done by Rush is nearly identical to that in the 
poster distributed by Nike. Although the face and partial body images 
of other famous golfers appear in blue sketch blending in the 
background of Rush’s print, the clear focus of the work is Woods in 
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full body image, wearing his red shirt and holding his famous swing in 
the pose which is nearly identical to that depicted in the Nike poster.
145
 
Judge Clay thus concluded that the depiction was simply a literal 
one, comparable to the image of The Three Stooges in Comedy III.
146
 The 
majority and dissenting judges in this case, like those in Hart, clearly have 
very different conceptions of transformativeness. Even though the judges in 
both cases seem to be operating largely out of the creative-metamorphosis 
paradigm,
147
 they perceive very different qualities when analyzing the exact 
same works.
148
 This kind of impressionistic, rudderless inquiry poses grave 
dangers to free expression by chilling artists’ creativity: If the law leaves 
speakers unclear about the limits of permissible expression, then speakers 
tend to self-censor. 
C.  Transformation as New Purpose 
Can an unaltered image—one physically mirroring the original and 
devoid of any new elements or changes other than, perhaps, being reduced 
in size or cropped slightly—be used in a transformative way that constitutes 
a fair use? Put more provocatively, can an image be transformed if it is not 
transformed? The answer to both these queries is yes, at least sometimes, 
and particularly when the secondary image is deployed for a very different 
purpose or function. 
The seminal case in this “faux transformation”149 strand of the 
transformative-use doctrine is the 2000 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit in Núñez v. Caribbean International News Corp.
150
 The 
appellate court faced the issue of whether a newspaper’s republication of 
photographs without the permission of the copyright-holding photographer 
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constituted a fair use because the photos were “independently 
newsworthy.”151 In particular, the photos depicted a beauty pageant winner 
named Joyce Giraud in various stages of undress and were originally taken 
as part of her modeling portfolio.
152
 The images, however, were considered 
pornographic by some people, thus sparking a newsworthy controversy 
“over whether they were appropriate for a Miss Puerto Rico Universe.”153 
Put differently, the photos were originally taken for one purpose—to serve 
as part of Giraud’s modeling portfolio—but were republished by El Vocero 
for what the First Circuit characterized as the “informative function”154 of 
calling into question whether Giraud should keep her crown. 
 In ruling in favor of the newspaper’s right to publish the photos 
without the permission of photographer Sixto Núñez, the First Circuit found 
it important that the photos 
were originally intended to appear in modeling portfolios, not in the 
newspaper; the former use, not the latter, motivated the creation of the 
work. Thus, by using the photographs in conjunction with editorial 
commentary, El Vocero did not merely ‘supersede[] the objects of the 
original creations,’ but instead used the works for ‘a further purpose,’ 
giving them a new ‘meaning, or message.’ It is this transformation of 
the works into news—and not the mere newsworthiness of the works 
themselves—that weighs in favor of fair use.
155
  
In brief, the photos initially were captured for one purpose, but 
served another when used in combination with surrounding textual material 
in the newspaper. The First Circuit added that “it would have been difficult 
to report the news without reproducing the photograph[s].”156 Núñez, as the 
First Circuit reiterated in 2012, stands for the proposition that combining 
photos with editorial commentary may create a new use for the works.
157
 
Professor Kathleen Olson bluntly calls this an “absurd conception 
of transformative use.”158 She asserts that the First Circuit “seemed to be 
saying the modeling photograph was actually transformed into a new 
thing—news—by its subsequent use.”159 According to Olson, Kelly v. 
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Arriba Soft Corp.
160
 (described below) and Núñez collectively stand for the 
rather simple proposition that “if the work is used for a different purpose 
from the original, it is transformative.”161 While Olsen believes the 
outcomes in these cases are desirable, she criticizes how far these courts 
have strayed from the basic concept of transformativeness introduced in 
Campbell.
162
 In its application, of course, the end result is far more than a 
semantic quagmire over how something can be transformed if it is not 
literally transformed. 
Kelly emphasized not only the different function served by the 
borrowing work, but the fact that the work was altered in a way that made it 
unsuitable for its original purpose. In Kelly, the Ninth Circuit held in 2002 
that an Internet search engine called Arriba that displayed its results in the 
form of thumbnails (small images) rather than text did not violate the 
copyright of photographer Leslie Kelly, whose images were among those 
that appeared as thumbnails.
163
 Kelly asserted that “because Arriba 
reproduced his exact images and added nothing to them, Arriba’s use cannot 
be transformative,”164 but the Ninth Circuit ruled “that Arriba’s use of 
Kelly’s images for its thumbnails was transformative.”165 In reaching this 
conclusion, the appellate court cited favorably the First Circuit’s decision in 
Núñez
166
 and reasoned that: 
Arriba’s use of the images serves a different function than Kelly’s 
use—improving access to information on the Internet versus artistic 
expression. Furthermore, it would be unlikely that anyone would use 
Arriba’s thumbnails for illustrative or esthetic purposes because 
enlarging them sacrifices their clarity. Because Arriba’s use is not 
superseding Kelly’s use but, rather, has created a different purpose for 
the images, Arriba’s use is transformative.
167
 
A similar reasoning was followed in 2007, when the Ninth Circuit 
held in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.
168
 that the Google search 
engine’s use of thumbnail versions of copyrighted images owned by Perfect 
10 was “highly transformative.”169 The appellate court reasoned that 
“[a]lthough an image may have been created originally to serve an 
entertainment, aesthetic, or informative function, a search engine transforms 
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the image into a pointer directing a user to a source of information.”170 For 
the Ninth Circuit, Google’s use of these images in reduced form as 
thumbnails constituted “a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool. 
Indeed, a search engine may be more transformative than a parody because 
a search engine provides an entirely new use for the original work, while a 
parody typically has the same entertainment purpose as the original 
work.”171 The Ninth Circuit ultimately reiterated its earlier holding from 
Kelly that “even making an exact copy of a work may be transformative so 
long as the copy serves a different function than the original work.”172 
At this point, the precedential scope of the search-engine cases is 
less than clear. U.S. District Judge Denise Cote observed in 2013 in 
Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc.
173
 that both Perfect 10 
and Kelly involved the fair-use defense as it applies “to a search engine 
engaged in a transformative purpose”174 and, specifically, to the use of 
small-size, low-resolution thumbnails that are not market substitutes for the 
original images.
175
 The cases, however, may carry implications for other 
areas. As one legal commentator recently asserted: 
Although [Kelly and Perfect 10] extend only to the use of thumbnail 
images in an Internet-based search engine, it can be argued that the use 
of images in the classroom environment differs substantially from the 
original use of the images as a form of artistic expression. Such a use 
is therefore transformative and, like the Internet search engine, 
provides an important societal benefit, namely that of education.
176
 
While the logic in Kelly and Perfect 10 thus might be expanded to 
other areas where unaltered images are used, Professor Thomas Cotter 
contends that the problem with the courts’ reasoning in those cases “is that 
it provides no basis for determining the level of abstraction at which the 
parties’ purposes should be compared.”177 Cotter asserts that a thumbnail 
“may not serve the same immediate purpose as the original, but it may assist 
in serving the same ultimate purpose.”178 This distinction, Cotter argues, 
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may affect “whether the ‘harm’ asserted by the copyright owner should be 
cognizable.”179 
Moreover, even identifying the purpose behind the creation of the 
original work as a baseline against which to measure the borrower’s 
claimed change of purpose generates difficult questions. As Professor R. 
Anthony Reese once pointed out, there is no judicial consensus whether to 
consider the purpose the original author “actually had in mind when 
creating the work, or . . . the purpose that a reasonable author creating this 
type of work would have had in mind.”180 If the former, should courts allow 
potentially self-serving testimony from the plaintiff on this point? Professor 
Reese also noted that some authors may have multiple purposes in mind 
when creating certain works, or may even decide to use a work for an 
entirely different purpose after its creation.
181
 These kinds of questions 
introduce tremendous complexity into what some courts have attempted to 
portray as a straightforward and undemanding inquiry.  
Illustrating the difficulty in fathoming different purposes and 
disputing the notion that serving a different purpose can make the same 
content transformative, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Infinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Kirkwood
182
 rejected claims by defendant 
Kirkwood that the unaltered retransmission of Infinity’s copyrighted radio 
content on a different medium (“Dial-Up” phone lines) served 
transformative purposes. Kirkwood argued that subscribers used its service 
factual purposes, such as “auditioning on-air talent” or “verifying the 
broadcast of commercials,” rather than the entertainment purposes of 
Infinity’s over-the-air audience.183 The Second Circuit emphasized that 
“difference in purpose is not quite the same thing as transformation”184 and 
that “a change of format, though useful, is not technically a 
transformation.”185 
The appellate court in Infinity Broadcasting also suggested that an 
audience’s different use of the same retransmitted content does not make it 
transformative. The defendant Kirkwood argued that his “users transform 
the broadcasts by using them for their factual, not entertainment, 
content.”186 The court rejected Kirkwood’s reasoning, stating that “it is 
Kirkwood’s own retransmission of the broadcasts, not the acts of his end-
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users, that is at issue here and all Kirkwood does is sell access to unaltered 
radio broadcasts.”187 
 Is the Núñez different-purpose line of news cases limited narrowly 
to only instances where “the underlying photos are newsworthy in 
themselves”188 or does it apply more broadly? The divided August 2012 
opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Monge v. 
Maya Magazines, Inc.
189
 illustrates the ambiguity that today plagues this 
different-purpose news facet of the transformative-use doctrine.  
In Monge, a three-judge panel considered whether a gossip 
magazine’s unauthorized publication of stolen photos depicting a pop 
singer’s previously private and secret wedding to her manager was a 
transformative use.
190
 As used in the magazine, each of the photos “was 
reproduced essentially in its entirety; neither minor cropping nor the 
inclusion of headlines or captions transformed the copyrighted works.”191 
Maya, the publisher of TVNotas magazine, nonetheless argued that even if 
the original wedding photos of Noelia Lorenzo Monge and Jorge Reynoso 
were not physically or creatively transformed, their publication in a 
magazine “as an exposé amounted to transformation” because it 
“transformed the photos from their original purpose—images of a wedding 
night—into newsworthy evidence of a clandestine marriage.”192  
Speaking broadly on the subject of transformative use, the majority 
initially noted that “transformation is a judicially-created consideration” in 
fair-use determinations.
193
 Citing Perfect 10 for the notion that using images 
in a new context for a different purpose “may be transformative,”194 the 
two-judge Ninth Circuit majority conceded that the magazine’s purpose in 
publishing the photos in order to expose the couple’s clandestine wedding 
“was at odds with the couple’s purpose of documenting their private 
nuptials.” But the majority asserted that “an infringer’s separate purpose, by 
itself, does not necessarily create new aesthetics or a new work”195 
amounting to a transformative use, and it distinguished Perfect 10. 
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Specifically, it reasoned that “unlike the thumbnail images at issue in 
Perfect 10, Maya left the inherent character of the images unchanged.”196  
The Monge majority also distinguished the facts before it from 
those in Núñez: 
The controversy [in Núñez] was whether the salacious photos 
themselves were befitting a “Miss Universe Puerto Rico,” and whether 
she should retain her title. In contrast, the controversy here has little to 
do with photos; instead, the photos here depict the couple’s clandestine 
wedding. The photos were not even necessary to prove that 
controverted fact—the marriage certificate, which is a matter of public 
record, may have sufficed to inform the public that the couple kept 
their marriage a secret for two years.
197
 
 Put differently, the Monge majority found that the unaltered images 
in Núñez were themselves the story,
198
 while in Monge the unaltered images 
were not at all necessary to tell the story, as a marriage certificate would 
have been a suitable substitute to prove the existence of the couple’s 
wedding. This analysis comports with the opinion of Professors Mark 
Bartholomew and John Tehranian that “necessity also plays a powerful role 
in limiting the types of news-related uses that qualify as transformative for 
the purposes of the fair use analysis.”199 Ultimately, the majority in Monge 
concluded that the magazine’s use of the wedding photos constituted 
“wholesale copying sprinkled with written commentary” that “was at best 
minimally transformative.”200 
 In stark contrast, Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr., concluded in his dissent 
“that the fundamentally different purpose underlying Maya’s publication of 
the photos constituted a transformative use.”201 Smith reasoned that 
“Maya’s commentary, editing, and arrangement of the photos added to, and 
ultimately changed, the original character of the images by advancing them 
as the basis of an exposé. The extent of Maya’s editing, commentary, and 
arrangement thus weighs in favor of a finding of transformativeness.”202  
Even more fundamentally, Judge Smith parted company with the 
majority on the weight that transformativeness itself should be given in fair 
use analyses. While the Monge majority had dubbed the question of 
transformativeness “far from being determinative” of fair use and “simply 
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one of the factors”203 courts consider, Judge Smith ramped up its 
significance. “The transformative use analysis is an integral question under 
the first factor, and in fair use generally,” Smith argued.204 He added that 
“the more transformative the use, the less other factors, such as 
commerciality, weigh against a finding of fair use.”205 Smith’s view 
comports with Professor Michael Murray’s recent assertion that the 
transformative test “has become the defining standard for fair use”206 and 
Professor R. Anthony Reese’s observation that the “rise of 
transformativeness as an explicit, and important, aspect of fair use 
analysis.”207 
In Monge, Judge Smith emphasized that the magazine’s “exposé 
served an entirely different purpose—indeed, a purpose contrary to the 
Couple’s original intent to record and conceal their Las Vegas wedding.”208 
This was particularly significant for Judge Smith because he noted that 
Judge Pierre Leval had asserted in his influential law journal article
209
 that 
“[t]ransformative uses may include criticizing the quoted work, exposing 
the character of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea 
argued in order to defend or rebut it.”210 In this case, the publication of the 
photos: 1) exposed the character of the pop singer as conniving by wanting 
to keep her wedding a secret in order to protect her image of being a single 
singer with appeal to young people; 2) proved the fact she was married; and 
3) and rebutted the notion that she was single.
211
 As Judge Smith wrote, the 
magazine’s “article constituted much more than a haphazard republication 
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of the Couple’s photos. Framed around the Couple’s refusals to confirm 
their marriage and to continue to represent Noelia as an ‘unwed sex 
symbol,’ Maya used the images as documentary evidence.”212 
The split decision in Monge is troubling not only because it 
illustrates the slipperiness and subjectivity of the transformative-use inquiry 
in cases where there has been no physical transformation of the images in 
question, but also because it demonstrates the vast power that judges wield 
over determining what is or is not newsworthy. Professor Amy Gajda 
asserts that Monge “has the potential to seriously impact future news 
decisions by journalists.”213 To the extent journalists face tremendous 
ambiguity in the determination of transformative use in news contexts, news 
organizations may be much less likely to risk infringement liability by 
publishing newsworthy material that may be subject to copyright claims. 
Also in 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
that Hustler magazine’s unauthorized publication of a copyrighted photo of 
a television news anchor in its “Hot News Babes” feature was not 
transformative.
214
 The photo was taken at a wet t-shirt contest, and it 
previously appeared on a website called lenshead.com before it was taken 
down after the woman depicted in it, Catherine Bosley, purchased its 
copyright from photographer Gontran Durocher. Although citing Perfect 10 
for the proposition that “reprinting a photograph may not result in an 
automatic copyright violation,”215 the Sixth Circuit reasoned that Hustler 
“did not add any creative message or meaning”216 to Durocher’s photograph 
and, instead, had “merely reprinted [the photo] in a different medium—a 
magazine rather than a website.”217 Inventively, counsel for Hustler argued 
that the magazine’s “use was transformative because the original work was 
published on lenshead.com to depict the fact that Bosley participated in the 
wet t-shirt contest, whereas Defendant used the picture to ‘illustrate its 
entertainment news story.’”218 The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, 
finding that Hustler’s “use of the photograph was the same as Durocher’s 
original use—to shock, arouse, and amuse”219 and that it was reasonable to 
conclude that Hustler was “selling a picture, not a [news] story.”220 This last 
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salvo fired at Hustler, although perhaps amusing given the subject 
magazine's reputation as pornographic, nonetheless illustrates the danger for 
First Amendment press freedom when judges use the language of faux 
transformation to determine what is and is not a newsworthy purpose and, 
in turn, what speech is or is not protected. 
One critical, factual difference between Monge and Balsley may be 
that the text directly relating to the unaltered photo in the latter case 
consisted of only a single paragraph.
221
 Thus, whether an unaltered image is 
significantly transformed by surrounding textual material may be part 
quantitative (the amount of text used) and part qualitative (the overall story 
and the nexus between the photo and the story). It is unclear how much text 
accompanying a photo is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for 
holding that it serves a transformative use. 
Ultimately, both the news story and thumbnail cases suggest that a 
secondary user’s “exact replication of a copyrighted image”222 may 
nonetheless be transformative when republished in a different context that 
serves a different purpose from the primary use.
223
 Determining precisely 
how much surrounding context must exist, how different that context must 
be, and precisely how a different purpose is measured in order to be 
transformative remains troubling two decades after Campbell.
224
 
CONCLUSION 
Given the bewildering variety of models for transformation, it 
seems beyond argument that the doctrine is in a muddled state. Not only are 
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the multiple models of transformativeness incompatible, but judges 
applying the same paradigm are frequently examining very different 
elements in borrowed works to make the determination. Professor Paul 
Goldstein called the transformative-use doctrine, at least in certain 
applications, “a triumph of mindless sound bite over principled analysis.”225 
Another noted IP scholar put it this way: “At the end of the day, 
characterizing a use as transformative may be nothing more than a 
conclusion based on some unconscious, inarticulable balancing of social 
costs and benefits.”226 
As noted earlier, this incoherence tends to create a disturbing First 
Amendment chilling effect. As the Supreme Court remarked recently: 
“Vague laws force potential speakers to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone’ . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly 
marked.”227 Given the transformative-use doctrine’s primacy in copyright 
fair use, not to mention its stranglehold on First Amendment determinations 
in publicity cases following Comedy III, the confused state of the doctrine 
seems chilling indeed. 
Obviously, the Supreme Court bears some responsibility for the 
current confusion, given the ambiguity of the Campbell formulation and the 
lack of guidance since. The Campbell Court seemed entranced with the 
notion of transformative use, but its explication of the concept left 
considerable room for interpretation, particularly as to how 
transformativeness applied outside of the parody context. However, to be 
fair to the Court, transformativeness was merely one ingredient in the mix 
in Campbell. It is only in the ensuing twenty years that transformative use 
has become nearly determinative in the overall fair-use calculus in 
copyright, and supremely important in publicity cases that hew to the 
Comedy III approach. 
This Article has analyzed some of the ambiguity created by the 
transformative-use doctrine. Clearly, as a start, putative fair users need (and 
deserve) a clearer conceptual map of the terrain than courts have thus far 
provided. Normatively, it seems doubtful that the transformative-use 
doctrine, even if substantially clarified at the level of concept and 
application, should be called upon to do the majority of the work in these 
cases. 
One suggestion is returning the doctrine to a more modest role in 
fair-use cases. Transformative use, which almost certainly should include 
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uses that add new meaning or message even without referring to the 
borrowed work, could operate once again as the Campbell Court seemed to 
intend it, as an ameliorating device in cases of commercial borrowing, 
rather than as a meta-factor that seems to trump all other considerations. 
This sort of “transformative minimalism” seems more in keeping with the 
spirit of the statute rather than the bloated doctrine now dominating the 
scene post-Campbell. 
Another alternative to jettisoning transformative use to the ash can 
of failed fair-use considerations is to limit its application to particular forms 
of copyrightable expression. In other words, should transformative use be 
applied equally to news, photographs, paintings, novels and songs, or might 
it be that it is more relevant to only some of these forms of expression? For 
instance, transformative use might constitute an appropriate form of 
inquiry—even be the driving factor—when the context is one of a written 
parody, as it was in Campbell with song lyrics, but not be applicable to 
visual imagery such as photographs (as in Prince in 2013). While most 
judges are presumably familiar with the written-narrative convention of 
parody and the social convention of jokes, due to their generally high level 
of education, they may not have a similar understanding of certain 
conventions of photography and visual artworks like those at issue in 
Prince. The less-recognized and more obtuse the convention of expression 
employed by the secondary user—the convention of visual appropriation 
art, for instance, in Prince—the less weight, if any, might be given to 
transformative use. This approach would seem to comport with the principle 
from Campbell that a parodic character must “reasonably be perceived.”228 
Put differently, the perception of whether something constitutes a written 
parody may be more reasonably gleaned and more readily explained in a 
judicial opinion than the perception of whether image-based appropriation 
art is transformative. While the reasonable-perception criterion purports to 
add some objectivity to the transformative-use inquiry, much like the 
concept of reasonableness provides objectiveness in negligence cases,
229
 
reasonable judgments may be too difficult to make when the convention 
deployed by the secondary user that allegedly transforms the original is 
poorly understood. 
The quest for an objective metric of transformative use thus might 
more readily lend itself to a conventional movie genre, like romantic 
comedies, with which judges would be reasonably familiar. This proved to 
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be the case in July 2013 when U.S. District Judge Michael P. Mills held that 
the paraphrased use in Woody Allen’s movie Midnight in Paris of a line 
from William Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun was transformative.230 In 
rendering his decision, Judge Mills pointed to four specific and seemingly 
objective factors militating in favor of transformativeness – “[t]he speaker, 
time, place, and purpose of the quote in these two works.”231 Even the 
switching of the quote from one medium to another—from the printed word 
to the celluloid image—was an objective factor Judge Mills considered, 
calling it “relevant that the copyrighted work is a serious piece of literature 
lifted for use in a speaking part in a movie comedy, as opposed to a printed 
portion of a novel printed in a newspaper, or a song’s melody sampled in 
another song. This transmogrification in medium tips this factor in favor of 
transformative, and thus, fair use.”232 It seems highly unlikely on remand in 
Prince that U.S. District Judge Deborah A. Batts will be able to point to 
such objective criteria in determining whether the remaining five images by 
Richard Prince are transformative enough to constitute a fair use of Patrick 
Cariou’s photographs of Rastafarians. 
Yet even in the well-recognized and understood convention of 
parody from which the transformative-use inquiry began two decades ago in 
Campbell, it runs the risk of boiling down to a highly subjective formula: If 
it’s funny, it’s transformative. Ultimately, as this Article has attempted to 
demonstrate, the transformative-use inquiry is far from a laughing matter 
for the law of copyright. 
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